Rumsfeld considers war crime prosecution risk. But he was unw바카라사이트illing to go there. Rather than challenge the intelligence officials in a court of law, he simply ignored them. And that, by the way, is exactly what he did during his first years as secretary of defense.
I don’t know what war crimes means. But I can at least make some sense of how he managed to do so.
Let’s start with this:
(a) The Bush administration and the intelligence agencies had little faith in its own estimates of Iraqi intelligence. At the CIA’s request, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer refused to say whether there were any gaps in CIA estimates of Iraqi chemical and biological capabilities in 2003 (CIA memos indicate that intelligence estimates about weapons of mass destruction were low, and that the intelligence community had little or no confidence in military action in Iraq).
So after Bush left office, the CIA and other agencies began telling themselves that there were no differences between intelligence estimates of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons, its weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons. And that led to this:
This year, in a new effort to be more open, the CIA has come out with a new effort called “The World on the Edge,” where it’s trying to make sure that the intelligence it gathers isn’t about something so far outside its expertise—especially in the age of the Internet. It started using the Internet in October, and it now uses information stored on public-access databases and the Internet to update their maps—including 바카라사이트one map which includes both Iraq and Afghanistan—as new intelligence is received. Some data in the Iraq maps, such as the ones used by the Bush administration, are even more uncertain. One of those is the presence of oil wells in some areas of Iraqi Kurdistan that could be used to manufacture nerve gas. While most conventional scientists would say that there’s virtually no evidence of such gas production, an American intelligence officer told NPR that “it’s always possible”.
(b) When the intelligence community asked the Pentagon to look into whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, “they didn’t see a way of proving it”—and this doesn’t mean the information th바카라ey got wasn’t true. Rather, the Pentagon’s general counsel, Dan Coats, told a congressional hearing that his agency “lacks the resources to assess [these issues] in a way to identify who and what is, or is not, lying to the public” and “would require our ability to review all of the information that we collect in this area.”